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宋阳波助理教授讲座通知

发布时间: 2018/01/02 14:36:06     点击次数:次   打印本页

【北航经管学术论坛】

宋阳波助理教授讲座通知

报告题目:Learning of Actions in Finitely Repeated Games

报告人:宋阳波助理教授香港中文大学(深圳)经济管理学院

时间:1月12日10:00—11:30

地点:A1038

邀请人:崔志伟副教授

摘要:This paper studies a novel setting

in game theory: a player may learn new actions over time by observing the

opponent's play. We investigate the impact of such learning behavior in the

context of finitely repeated games. In contrast to related literature such as

Kreps et al. (1982), we provide a framework with full rationality and

consistent stage-game payoffs for sustaining cooperation, which bridges the gap

between theories of finitely and infinitely repeated games. Even if rational

cooperation is impossible without learning, for instance in a Prisoner's

Dilemma, it can be sustained with approximate efficiency when players can learn

from one another. Cooperation does not have to be endowed in each player's

initial action set, but can be ``taught'' and enforced. When learning is

imperfect, the set of sustainable payoffs is not continuous, in the sense that

no equilibrium exists when learning is nearly perfect and the repeated games

last for sufficiently many periods.

经管学院科研办

2018-01-02