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北航经商院 • 经济学双周论坛 第十四期

发布时间: 2018/06/21 17:10:38     点击次数:次   打印本页

北航经商院 • 经济学双周论坛 第十四期

尊敬的各位老师:

   你们好!

   “北航经商院 • 经济学双周论坛”将在本周迎来第十四期讨论,具体安排如下:

时间:本周五(6月22日)中午12:00-14:00

地点:新主楼A1138。

   在此诚挚邀请您参与讨论和分享!

题目: 应急可转债在信号传递和信息披露中的作用

TitleThe Role of Contingent Capital Structure in Signaling and Information Disclosure

主讲人: 俞苏秀

Presenter: SuxiuYu

摘要 (Abstract):

   本文指出应急可转债的两个新的功能,它是信号传递和激励信息披露的有效工具。首先,在合理的设计下,应急可转债可以激励发行方(银行)在未来披露真实信息。其次,当披露错误信息有成本时,应急可转债可比传统证券更有效地传递信号。好的银行可以通过发行在触发条件下转股比率更高的应急可转债向市场传递好信号,因为此行为说明银行认为未来陷入危机的可能性很小,于是愿意在危机发生后承担更大惩罚。本文为应急可转债的设计和银行资本结构监管提供了新的思路。

   This paper highlights two novel advantages of contingent convertible securities in capital structure. First, a contingent capital structure has an advantage over non-contingent capital in its ability to mitigate ex-post information asymmetries, since it has more degrees of freedom in setting payoffs to fine-tune the issuer's truth-telling incentives. Second, contingent securities can provide more signaling power than non-contingent securities as long as misreporting is costly. A good banker can credibly signal his type by issuing contingent securities with high conversion ratio, since it shows that the banker is willing to suffer a lot when trigger event (or crisis) occurs, indicating he has great confidence in the future performance. This paper thus sheds some new light on the design of CoCos and the regulation of contingent capital.

主讲人简介 (Introduction):

   俞苏秀,中国人民大学汉青高级经济与金融研究院助理教授,2017年毕业于法国图卢兹经济学院。研究领域包括公司金融,银行,信息经济学,合同理论等。

Suxiu Yu, assitant professor of Finance in Hanqing Advanced Institute of Economics and Finance, Renmin University of China. She graduated from Toulouse School of Economics in 2017. Her fields of interest include corporate finance, banking, information economics, contract theory.

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经济与商学研究院

2018年6月21日