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缓解中小企业融资问题——基于电子商务平台的视角

发布时间: 2019/06/13 17:42:36     点击次数:次   打印本页

信管前沿”学习研究系列讲座 第三期

题目:缓解中小企业融资问题——基于电子商务平台的视角

Title:Financing Small and Medium-Size Enterprises via Retail Platforms

主讲人:任龙助理教授

Presenter:Long Ren

主持人:郝金星副教授

时间:2019年6月19日12:15-13:30

地点:北航新主楼A座618

摘要(Abstract:

We study the multifaceted impact of loan programs initiated by a retail platform to its sellers on these sellers’ operational and financing decisions, profits of the sellers and the platform, as well as consumer welfare. Many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on retail platforms face capital constraints that limit their ability to meet market demand. Due to lack of sufficient asset and credit history, SMEs also face the challenge of securing loans from traditional banks. Therefore, the financial loan decisions of a retail platform to its SMEs have become an essential part of the platform design. We develop a two-stage game-theoretic model where multiple SMEs who face financial constraints compete on a retail platform, and the platform decides who to offer financial loans and what are the loan credit lines. We show that the competitive landscape on the platform greatly affects the effectiveness of the platform's loan programs. Offering a generous loan to a monopoly seller on the platform benefits all stakeholders. Offering generous loans to competing sellers, however, can make sellers worse-off in the equilibrium where they are willing to accept the loans -- a prisoner's dilemma. The platform can, by strategically setting the loan limit, reduce the intensity of the prisoner's dilemma for sellers in high or moderate need of funds. Two factors -- the platform's required rate of return and referral fee -- affect the platform's willingness-to-lend and the interaction between the platform and the sellers. We also find that offering asymmetric loans to symmetric competing sellers can benefit both the platform and the sellers as a whole. The research findings provide useful implications for retail platforms on how to offer financial loans to sellers based not only on an individual seller's characteristics but also on the competition in the marketplace. From a government perspective, our research also sheds light on the impact of a platform's loan decisions on consumer welfare and how such decisions should be regulated.

主讲人简介(Introduction)

任龙,对外经济贸易大学信息学院助理教授,于2018年获得清华大学经济管理学院管理科学与工程专业博士学位,美国圣路易斯华盛顿大学奥林商学院访问学者,研究方向为运营管理、供应链金融、风险管理、电子商务、商务智能与决策分析。以第一或通讯作者在Fuzzy Sets & Systems、IJPE、《中国管理科学》《管理工程学报》等国内外重要期刊发表论文多篇,并担任Decision Sciences、IEEE Trans on Fuzzy Systems、Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research等多个期刊的审稿人。目前为INFORMS、POMS、SIAM以及GARP会员。