商学悦道讲座
2026年第1期，总第73期
题目：消费者数据可携权：数字“守门人”的数据战略及其市场影响
主讲人：杜金钊，香港大学商学院市场系副教授
讲座时间：3月30号下午15:30-17:30
地点：A1148
主持人：刘霖 教授
讲座嘉宾：
Dr. DU is the Associate Professor of Marketing at Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong. He received the Ph.D. in Marketing from Duke University in 2018, and B.A. in Economics from Tsinghua University in 2012.His research investigates platform-based marketing, with a particular focus on media platforms and matching platforms. Media platforms are multi-sided and as such have multiple players: publishers, consumers, advertisers, content suppliers, and news aggregators. My work examines the strategic interactions among these players and analyze media platforms' decisions such as pricing, content provision, and collaboration with news aggregators. Matching platforms, including dating, review, and ride-sharing platforms, aim to match two groups of users but face challenges such as preference mismatch, information asymmetry, and selection bias. My work studies how information design, pricing, and AI development can address these challenges and improve matching outcomes, and their implications for firm strategies, consumer welfare, and regulators' policymaking.
His recent research also examines how consumers' data rights and firms' adoption of AI tools are reshaping the landscape of platform-based marketing. He uses game-theoretic models to enhance understanding of new phenomena and practices in this growing field.
讲座概要：
Digital gatekeepers, such as Google and Meta, increasingly leverage the vast consumer data collected through their core services to gain an advantage when entering adjacent product markets. Recent data regulations, such as the EU’s Digital Markets Act, grant consumers the right to transfer their data from gatekeepers to third-party competitors, aiming to foster fair competition. By building a theoretical model in which a gatekeeper competes with a third-party firm—both of whose products can improve in quality through integration with the gatekeeper’s consumer data—this paper examines the market implications of data portability. We first show that data technology and data volume are substitutes in improving product quality when consumers have low data security concerns, but they become complements when the security concerns are strong. Second, with data portability, the gatekeeper chooses the data amount strategically—either to maximize the quality difference between its own and the competitor's products after data integration, or to prevent consumers from transferring their data to its competitor due to security concerns. Third, although the gatekeepers' data technology always benefits consumers, the third-party firm's data technology could hurt consumers. Fourth, when consumers' data security concerns exceed a certain threshold, data portability encourages the gatekeeper to become more aggressive in collecting consumer data. Fifth, data portability leads the gatekeeper to lose market share, reduce prices, and earn less profits, while its third-party competitor gains market share, increases prices, and earns higher profits. Finally, contrary to the policy’s intention to benefit consumers, data portability could harm some or all consumers due to shifts in the gatekeeper’s data collection strategies and the resulting price changes by both the gatekeeper and its third-party competitor.
