经济学系列论坛
2026年第2期，总第36期
报告题目：Deciphering Equilibrium Behavior in First-Price Auction-Like Mechanisms
报告嘉宾：吴泽南 北京大学经济学院 长聘教授
报告时间：5月18日（周一），10：00- 12：00
报告地点：新主楼A 618
邀请人： 吴俊杰 教授
报告摘要：
Auction models serve as convenient abstractions for the free-form price-formation processes typical of decentralized markets. However, equilibrium analysis in such auction-like settings is challenging, as market frictions often cause participants' bidding strategies to exhibit disconnected supports, non-monotonicity across types, or mass points. This paper develops a novel approach to equilibrium characterization in first-price auction-like mechanisms with a finite type space. Unlike the standard guess-and-verify approach that first posits equilibrium properties and then solves for bidding strategies, we reformulate the search for an equilibrium as a shooting problem: reducing the derivation of infinite-dimensional bidding strategies to finding a finite vector of equilibrium payoffs for each type that generates a path governed by the equilibrium conditions. We show that equilibrium existence is equivalent to the existence of a path that satisfies a simple regularity condition, allowing the equilibrium strategy profile to be recovered from this path—a property we term recoverability. Our approach thus bridges the literatures on equilibrium existence and characterization: proving existence simultaneously yields the bidding strategies. The recoverability condition can be guaranteed if the participants prefer winning to losing at their winning bids. We further leverage this insight to establish equilibrium existence for multi-unit pay-as-bid auctions with private values and possible loser forfeits, and multi-prize all-pay auctions with general value interdependence.
汇报人简介：
吴泽南，博士，北京大学博雅青年学者，长聘教授。2008年获得清华大学经济学学士，2015年获得宾夕法尼亚大学经济学博士。2015年9月加入北京大学经济学院，研究领域为应用微观理论，主要集中在竞赛理论、保险市场、产业组织理论与行为经济学。近年在Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, RAND Journal of Economics, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Journal of Public Economics, Information Systems Research, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 《经济研究》、《经济学（季刊）》等国内外顶级期刊上发表论文多篇。主持国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金项目、面上项目、青年项目（结项获评“特优”），获中国信息经济学乌家培资助计划资助，担任中国信息经济学会理事、中国运筹学会博弈论分会常务理事。主讲《高级微观经济学》、《经济学原理》等课程，获评北京高等学校优质本科教材课件、入选教育部课程思政示范课程、获第九届高等学校科学研究优秀成果奖（人文社会科学）、北京大学教学卓越奖、北京大学教学优秀奖等奖项。
