经济学系列论坛
2026年第6期，总第40期
报告题目：All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions
报告嘉宾：吕景峰 新加坡国立大学经济学 教务长讲席教授
报告时间：9月4日，周五，10：00 - 12：00
报告地点：新主楼A706
邀请人： 范英 教授
论文摘要：
This paper studies score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids. Under the common difference-score rule, we characterize the bidding equilibrium in closed form and derive comparative statics. We then solve for the procurer-optimal score rule. With power-form costs, a higher proportion of the all-pay quality component lowers quality, total surplus, and suppliers’ payoffs, while the procurer’s payoff may rise or fall. Reimbursing losing suppliers’ all-pay components increases quality and suppliers’ payoffs but reduces total surplus and the procurer’s payoff. The optimal score rule is quasi-linear in quality and price: it weights quality less than the procurer’s payoff function and is less sensitive to marginal increases in quality. Under a weakly convex reverse hazard rate, the optimal rule values quality more when quality is costlier to provide or when more suppliers participate. Our approach extends to environments with minimum score or quality constraints, multi-dimensional quality bids, and general score rules.
汇报人简介：
吕景峰是新加坡国立大学经济学教务长讲席教授。他主要是一位应用理论经济学家，研究方向包括拍卖、竞赛和机制设计。他也对拍卖、竞赛和匹配领域的实证研究感兴趣。他的论文发表于 American Economic Review、Review of Economic Studies、International Economic Review、Journal of Economic Theory、American Economic Journal: Microeconomics、Rand Journal of Economics、Journal of Public Economics、Games and Economic Behavior 和 Economic Theory 等诸多享有盛誉的学术期刊。 自 2015 年起，他担任 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 的副主编。
